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I.  Introduction 
 
There is a substantial literature on the relationship between teacher characteristics and 
student learning.  Most prior research on this topic has focused on teachers’ educational 
background, years of teaching experience and salaries.  The results of this work are mixed.  
While it is clear that certain teachers are more effective than others at increasing student 
performance, there is considerably less consensus on whether specific, observable teacher 
characteristics such as education or experience produce higher performance.
1  
While most research has focused on general skills, school districts and states often rely on 
in-service staff development as a way to improve student learning.  This on-the-job training seeks 
to instruct teachers in content as well as pedagogy.  Professional development is an extremely 
widespread practice in U.S. Public Schools.  Seventy-two percent of teachers report having 
engaged in training related to the subject area of their main teaching assignment during the 
previous 12 months (Parsad et. al. 2000).  A similar fraction reports having received training on 
how to implement new teaching methods.  Despite the widespread nature of these activities, the 
intensity of training is typically fairly low, with more than half of the teachers engaging in eight 
hours or less of training in each of these areas per year.  Unfortunately, most of the existing 
research on in-service training suffers from the fact that the training is endogenously determined 
by teachers and schools.   
                                                      
1 There is still considerable disagreement regarding the causal effect of educational expenditures on academic 
achievement.  Hanushek (1996) asserts that there is little evidence that increased educational expenditures can 
systematically increase academic achievement. Hedges and Greenwald (1996) offer a different interpretation of the 
evidence, claiming that although many individual studies find no significant effect, the average effect estimate is 
positive.  More recent experimental evidence suggests that at least one form of expenditure—reduced class size—
does have a substantial effect on student achievement (Krueger 1999).  Using a quasi-random research design, 2 
Recent school reforms in Chicago, however, provide an excellent opportunity to evaluate 
the causal impact of teacher training on student performance.  In 1996, the Chicago Public 
School system (CPS) placed 71 of its 489 elementary schools on academic probation.  These 
probation schools received special funding for staff development as well as technical assistance 
and enhanced monitoring.  Eligibility for probation was determined on the basis of standardized 
reading scores—schools in which fewer than 15 percent of students scored at or above national 
norms in reading were subject to probation; those with 15 percent or more of students at national 
norms were not subject to probation.  The existence of strict cutoffs created a highly non-linear 
relationship between a school’s reading achievement in 1996 and the likelihood that the school 
was on probation in subsequent years.  We exploit this discontinuity to identify the impact of 
teacher training on student achievement. 
Note that this strategy does not identify the aggregate effect of the school probation policy 
since the accountability measures provided all low-achieving schools (both those who just 
missed and just made the cutoff) an incentive to increase student performance because such low-
achieving schools that did not demonstrate improvement were subject to further sanctions.
2  
Rather, this strategy effectively identifies the impact of the resources provided to certain low-
achieving schools under the probation policy.  Because the technical assistance and monitoring 
resources provided to probation schools were quite small (see discussion below) and were 
designed primarily to enhance teacher classroom performance (and thus might be considered a 
component of teacher training), our discussion in this paper will focus on the impact of teacher 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Guryan (2000) also finds that increases in school funding may have increased the performance of elementary school 
students in Massachusetts. 
2 Jacob (2002) finds evidence that the incentives provided by school probation, along with student-oriented 
accountability measures, led to a substantial increase in math and reading achievement.  3 
training with the understanding that it includes the effect of all of the resources provided to 
schools under the probation policy.   
Utilizing exogenous variation in probation status caused by the discontinuity described 
above, we find that moderate increases in teacher training have no statistically or academically 
significant effect on either reading or math achievement.  These results do not vary across race, 
gender, socio-economic background or student ability and are robust to a number of alternative 
specifications.  Our results suggest that modest investments in staff development may not be 
sufficient to increase the achievement of elementary school children in high poverty schools.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature on 
teacher training and provides background on the Chicago probation policy.  Section 3 describes 
our data and Section 4 explains our empirical strategy.  Section 5 presents findings on the 
effectiveness of in-service training.  Section 6 explores the policy effects in more detail, 
examining the heterogeneity in effects across students and providing a series of robustness 
checks for our results.  Section 7 discusses some of the implications of these findings and 
concludes. 
 
II.  Background  
A. Prior  Literature 
Despite the importance of teacher training in most school districts, there is surprisingly 
little evidence on the effect of teacher training on student achievement.  Indeed, as Angrist and 
Lavy (2001) pointed out, there seems to have been more research on the impact of teacher 
training in developing countries than in developed countries.  Early research on teacher training 
presents a rather pessimistic view of the effectiveness of staff development for increasing student 4 
performance.  In a meta-analysis of 93 studies of the effect of teacher development on student 
performance, Kennedy (1998) report that only 12 studies show positive effects of staff 
development.  Consistent with this finding, Corcoran (1995) and Little (1993) claim that 
typically staff development is a low intensity affair that lacks continuity and accountability.  
There are some notable exceptions to these findings however.  Bressoux (1996), using a quasi-
experimental research design, and Dildy (1982), examining the results of a randomized trial, find 
that teacher training increases student performance.  Wiley and Yoon (1995) and Cohen and Hill 
(2000) are others who find teacher development programs to have at least small impacts on 
student performance. 
One recent paper that finds particularly strong effects of teacher training is Angrist and 
Lavy (2001).  The authors use difference-in-difference and matching strategies to estimate the 
causal effect of teacher training on student math and reading performance in Jerusalem 
elementary schools.  They find that teacher training increases student achievement by roughly 
0.25 standard deviations.  While this paper presents strong evidence regarding the potential 
effectiveness of teacher training programs, several features of the intervention limit the 
generalizability of the results.  First, because the schools were not randomly assigned to 
treatment, it is possible that the schools selected for the project were on an upward (or 
downward) trajectory, which may bias the difference-in-difference estimates.  Second, in 
addition to funding teacher training, the Jerusalem intervention consisted of several other 
components that might have increased student achievement, including the establishment of a 
learning center to assist failing students after school and a project to support immigrant students 
and their families.  Finally, the training component of the program was highly structured and 
directed specifically toward teaching a common curriculum.  5 
   
B.  Background on School Reform in Chicago 
The CPS is the nation’s third-largest school district, serving over 430,000 largely low-
income students.  In the late eighties, then Secretary of Education William Bennett described 
Chicago public schools as the worst in the nation.  In 1996, the CPS introduced a highly 
publicized reform effort that emphasized holding students, teachers and administrators 
accountable for academic achievement.  
Under the Chicago policy, schools in which fewer than 15 percent of students met 
national norms on standardized reading exams were placed on academic probation.
3   While 
several schools received waivers, 71 elementary schools serving over 45,000 students were 
placed on academic probation in the first year of the program.
4  To improve student achievement 
in these schools, the CPS provided probation schools additional resources to buy staff 
development services from an external organization of their choice.  In 1998-99, probation 
schools were working with 17 different external partners, including universities, non-profit 
organizations and independent consultants.  During the first year a school was on probation, the 
CPS paid 100 percent of the costs of the external partner (up to $90,000).  In the second year, the 
                                                      
3 The Chicago reform also included a student accountability policy in which students in third, sixth and eighth grade 
were required to meet minimum achievement levels in reading and math in order to move to the next grade.  For 
more details on the student accountability policy and its impact on student outcomes, see Jacob (2002) and Jacob and 
Lefgren (2001). 
4 Probation schools that do not exhibit sufficient improvement may be reconstituted, which involves the dismissal or 
reassignment of teachers and school administrators.  It appears that this was “cheap talk” as no elementary schools 
were ever reconstituted.  Additionally, teacher surveys suggest that the teachers did not perceive reconstitution as a 
threat.  In the early years of the program, in order to move off of probation, at least 20 percent of students in the 
school had to meet national norms in reading.  In 2000, the standard was raised so that schools with fewer than 20 
percent of students at national norms in reading were subject to probation and all schools needed to meet a 25 
percent standard to move off of probation.  In 1997-98, eight elementary schools were removed from probation 
because of achievement gains, but 13 additional schools were placed on probation.  By 1998-99, only 54 elementary 
schools were on probation. 
 6 
reimbursement dropped to 50 percent.  After two years, the Board paid one-third of the cost of 
external partners.   
In addition to these direct resources, the CPS provided probation schools with technical 
assistance and monitored the progress of the school.  The Office of Accountability (OA) assigned 
each probation school a probation manager, generally a high-level school administrator with 
experience as a principal, whose job was to help school staff to develop and implement a school 
improvement plan.  Elementary schools on probation were also assigned a business manager 
intern to manage the operational and financial aspects of the school, freeing the principal to 
address educational issues and to assist the external partners in staff development.   
Table 1 presents information regarding the effect of probation on teacher development 
(see Smylie et al. 2001 for a more detailed discussion of professional development in the CPS).
5  
The first two columns show that in 1994, teachers in schools that would be placed on probation 
in 1997 participated in school sponsored professional development at about the same rate as 
other teachers.  In 1997 and 1999, teachers in probation schools were participating at 
substantially higher levels than their colleagues.  In 1997, probation teachers attended an average 
of 3.4 professional development activities each month compared to only 2.6 activities for other 
teachers.
6  The increase is reflected in activities sponsored by the school, teacher networks, 
outside partners, and the CPS.  The differences in 1999 are somewhat less dramatic, which may 
be explained by the fact that some schools on probation in 1997 were taken off probation while 
                                                      
5 The data used for table come from surveys conducted by the Consortium on Chicago School Research.  These 
surveys were administered in 1994, 1997, and 1999 to all CPS teachers and asked a number of questions regarding 
the teachers’ work environment—including the extent and nature of professional development activities.  We thank 
the Consortium for making these data available. 
6 The data report participation during the past school year using ranges of values (e.g. 3-5 times in the last year).  To 
calculate average participation we assume that teacher participation was in the midpoint of the range.  We further 
assume teachers in the highest category attended 12 activities during the school year.  We divide the number of 7 
other schools were placed on probation.  This evidence suggests that probation increased the 
frequency of professional development activities by about 25 percent in the first year.  Teachers 
in probation schools also believed that the quality of teacher training activities improved under 
probation (see Smylie et al. 2001).  Finally, it is possible that teachers in probation schools 
received additional informal advice from probation partners. 
  It is also useful to put the magnitude of probation expenditures into perspective.  
Unfortunately, school-level records of professional development expenditures are not available.  
In addition, a significant fraction of the resources spent on teacher development efforts would not 
appear in a school’s budget, including the time of principals and district administrators used to 
coordinate development programs and monitor teachers.  Despite these challenges, it is useful to 
perform some back of the envelope calculations to put the magnitude of the probation policy into 
perspective. 
  Smylie et al. (2001) report that the CPS budgeted $75 million for professional 
development in the 1997-1998 school year.  This represented about 2.5 percent of the district’s 
total expenditures.  If teacher development expenditures were divided equally among grades (first 
to twelfth), then approximately $50 million would have been spent on elementary schools and 
average expenditures per elementary school would have been about $108,000.  If we use this as a 
rough baseline for professional development expenditures, the additional financial resources that 
were available under the probation policy seem substantial. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
reported activities by 6 (the number of months school had been in session at the time of the survey) to obtain 
monthly participation. 8 
III. Data 
This study utilizes administrative data from the Chicago Public School system.  Student 
records provide detailed demographic and educational background data on individual students for 
each academic year, including prior achievement scores, previous school and residential 
mobility, birth date, race, gender, family composition, free lunch status, and special education 
and bilingual services received.  School records provide average demographic data at the school 
level, including percent low-income, average daily attendance, and school mean test scores.  The 
primary outcome measures we use are math and reading scores on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills 
(ITBS), a multiple-choice exam that CPS students take annually in grades two to eight.  The 
ITBS is measured in terms of grade equivalents (GEs), which reflect the years and months of 
learning that a student has mastered.  For example, a student at national norms in sixth grade will 
score 6.8 GEs, which means the student has mastered material up to the eighth month of sixth 
grade. 
The baseline sample for this study consists of the cohort of third through sixth grade 
students who were enrolled in a Chicago elementary school in the Fall of 1996 (n=131,314).  We 
limit the sample to students in these grades because we measure performance gains over three 
years and ITBS scores are not available for students beyond eighth grade.  We delete 198 
students who attended a special needs school in the Fall of 1996 and 3,981 students (three 
percent) who are missing student or school demographic data, which leaves us with a sample of 
127,135 students in 461 different schools.
7   
                                                      
7 26,907 of these students did not take the ITBS exam in the Spring of 1996.  Most of the students with missing test 
scores were third graders in the Fall of 1996 because not all schools tested second grade students at this time.  In 
order to avoid dropping these students, we set the missing 1996 test scores to zero and include a binary variable to 
indicate that the test score was missing.  As a check, we have done the analysis excluding students with missing 1996 
test scores and obtained virtually identical results.  9 
  Table 2 presents summary statistics on this sample.  Roughly 20 percent of students 
attended a school on probation at some point between 1997-99 and these students spent an 
average of 1.9 years in a school on probation.  As one would expect, probation schools served the 
most disadvantaged students in the CPS.  Students who spent at least one year in a probation 
school scored roughly six to seven months beyond their peers in math and reading in 1996.  Over 
95 percent of students who attended a probation school received free lunch compared with 75 
percent of students who did not attend a probation school and students in probation schools were 
nearly twice as likely to be living in a foster home in Fall 1996.  Hispanic students were 
substantially less likely to attend a probation school than Black students—on average 12 percent 
of students attending probation schools were Hispanic compared with 25 percent of the CPS 
whereas nearly 87 percent of students attending probation schools were Black compared with 
only 60 percent in the CPS.  Similarly, students in probation schools experienced school level 
mobility, truancy, and low-income rates considerably higher than peers in non-probation schools.   
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
Teacher training is one of many factors that may influence student learning.  The 
relationship between inputs such as teacher training and learning outcomes can be captured in the 
following education production function: 
(1)   () is i s s i s is u Z X Training Y ε ν β + + + Γ + Β + = 1 , 
where Y is the outcome, Training indicates whether a student’s teachers received in-service 
training, X is a vector of student demographic and past performance variables, Z is a vector of 
other teacher and school characteristics, u  represents the effect of unobserved school quality, ν  10 
is unobserved student ability, ε  is an error term, and the i and s subscripts identify the individual 
and school respectively. 
  The difficulty in estimating the causal impact of Training is that teachers and schools 
may select, or be selected, into training on the basis of characteristics that are unobservable to the 
researcher.  In the case of teacher training, it is difficult to even sign the direction of the potential 
bias.  On one hand, as Lavy (1995) and others have noted, there is often a negative correlation 
between school inputs and pupil achievement because measures of socioeconomic disadvantage 
are used to decide which schools get the most inputs.  In this case, it is likely that 
() 0 , < s u Training Cov , which will bias the estimate of  1 β  downward.  On the other hand, to the 
extent that teacher training is often a voluntary activity determined by the teachers and 
administrators in a particular school, it is possible that the most motivated teachers and schools 
seek training so that  () 0 , > s u Training Cov , which will tend to bias  1 β  upward. 
The recent school reform efforts in Chicago, however, provide a unique opportunity to 
identify the causal impact of teacher training on student achievement.  The strict test score cutoff 
for probation generated a highly non-linear relationship between school reading performance in 
1996 and the average number of years a student spent in a school on probation between 1997 and 
1999.  Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the percent of students meeting national 
norms in a student’s 1996 school and the number of years between 1996 and 1999 that the 
student attended a school on probation.  We can see that students enrolled in schools where 13 
percent of students met national norms in 1996 attended schools on probation for an average of 
two years over this period.  In contrast, students in schools where 15 percent of students met 
national norms in 1996 attended schools on probation for only 0.30 years on average over the 
same period.  11 
This discontinuity provides a way to estimate the effect of teacher training on student 
achievement.  Assuming that unobservable characteristics do not vary discontinuously around the 
cutoff, the probation decision rule essentially replicates random assignment of training to schools 
around the cutoff.  One can thus identify the treatment effect by simply comparing students in 
schools on either side of the cutoff.  For example, if students in schools that just missed the 
cutoff (and were thus likely to be placed on probation and have access to the additional teacher 
training resources) learned much more than students in schools that just made the cutoff (and 
thus avoided probation), then one might conclude that the staff development and technical 
assistance associated with probation has a positive impact. 
This strategy is often referred to as a regression discontinuity design.
8  If there is a perfect 
relationship
9 between 1996 school reading achievement and the number of years a student spends 
in a school on probation, then a properly specified OLS model that included a dummy variable 
indicating whether the student was in a school below the cutoff in 1996 would provide unbiased 
estimates of the training effect.  However, there are several reasons that the relationship between 
years in a probation school and 1996 school reading achievement is not perfect.  First, several 
schools that scored below the probation cutoff were waived from the policy (e.g., 15 of the 77 
elementary schools that scored below the cutoff in 1996 received waivers).  Second, 25 schools 
that were placed on probation in 1996-97 raised achievement enough to be removed from 
                                                      
8 This type of regression discontinuity analysis was pioneered in educational evaluation research.  In one of the first 
papers to introduce this design, Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) utilized the fact that National Merit Awards are 
given on the basis of whether a test score exceeds a threshold to estimate the effect of the award on a student’s other 
scholarship receipt and college aspirations.  This strategy was used widely in evaluations of compensatory education 
programs mandated under Title I (Trochim, 1984) as well as other contexts.  Other studies to use this design include 
Berk and Rauma (1983), Angrist and Lavy (1999), Black (1999), Hahn et al. (1999), Jacob and Lefgren (2001) and 
Guryon (2001). 
9 By perfect relationship, we mean that the treatment is completely determined by observed performance.  In this 
case, treatment is necessarily orthogonal to any unobserved characteristics.  Thus, after controlling appropriately for 12 
probation in the next two years.  Conversely, 16 schools that missed the probation cutoff in the 
first year were placed on probation in the following two years.  Finally, there was substantial 
student mobility.  Many students moved between probation and non-probation schools during 
this period.   
To account for the “fuzzy” discontinuity, we utilize an instrumental variables strategy.  In 
the first stage, we predict the number of years a student will spend in a school on probation as a 
function of observable student demographics and prior achievement as well as the mean reading 
achievement in the student’s school in 1996.  Specifically, the first stage equation takes the 
following form: 






1 η ν γ γ γ γ γ + + + Β + Γ + + + =
+ − −  
where Z and X are defined as previously indicated.  The variables labeled Norms capture the non-
linear relationship observed in Figure 1.  The superscripts over the Norms variables indicate the 
use of a spline.  For example, a student in a school with 16 percent of the students at or above 
national norms would have a value of 14 for 
14 0− Norms , a value of 1 for 
15 14− Norms , and a value 
of 1 for 
+ 15 Norms .   We then estimate the 1999 achievement in a two-stage least squares 
framework using the predicted value of the years in a probation school.   
Because we know the nature of the non-linearity between school reading performance and 
years in a probation school ex-ante, the functional form of the selection equation provides 
convincing exclusion restrictions necessary for IV estimation.  However, our approach does rely 
on several assumptions.  Most importantly, we must assume that unobserved characteristics 
                                                                                                                                                                           
performance, the OLS estimates should be unbiased because the treatment is orthogonal to the error term.  
Furthermore, IV and OLS estimates will be the same because the treatment is perfectly predicted in the first stage. 13 
and/or effort vary continuously with the measured performance around the cutoff.
10  This may 
not be true in cases where participants have precise control over their performance, particularly 
near the margin of interest, or in cases in which failing to achieve a cutoff is associated with 
additional consequences not directly related to the treatment in question.   
One such concern in our case is that teachers or school administrators may attempt to 
influence student scores on the margin.  For example, a school that knows it is in danger of 
probation may attempt to influence testing to get on probation (and thus get the associated 
resources) or get off probation (to avoid potential sanctions).  While Jacob and Levitt (2002) 
identify cases in which Chicago teachers may have improperly assisted students on exams, this 
behavior appears limited to a relatively small number of classrooms and is thus unlikely to affect 
our results.   
Another concern is student mobility.  Since prior research indicates that student mobility 
rates are generally higher in lower achieving schools (see Kerbow, 1996; Hanushek, Kain, and 
Rivikin 2001), we expect to find higher mobility rates among probation schools in comparison to 
non-probation schools.  While high mobility in itself is not problematic, if probation causes high-
achieving or motivated students to leave the CPS our estimates may be biased.
11  Using the 
regression discontinuity design above, we are able to examine whether probation status itself 
caused certain students to leave the school or the CPS.  As we show in the next section, it 
                                                      
10 Actually, it is sufficient that the unobserved characteristics do not vary discontinuously in the same fashion as the 
treatment. 
11 If probation simply causes students to change schools within the CPS, our estimates will not be biased but the 
interpretation of the IV estimates may change.  See Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) for 
a more detailed discussion of these issues. 14 
appears that probation did not induce student mobility, which reinforces the validity of the 
achievement estimates.
12 
The other important assumption in our analysis involves the functional form of the 
relationship between current school achievement and future student achievement.  Our 
instruments in equation (2) are nonlinear functions of school-level achievement.  If the true 
relationship between school mean achievement and future student performance is non-linear for 
the range of values we examine, the estimated treatment effect could reflect underlying non-
linearity in the achievement relationship.   
While this concern is mitigated to some extent since we examine schools within a limited 
range around the probation cutoff, we nonetheless examine whether it is a serious concern in this 
study.  First, we estimate models that allow for school mean achievement in 1996 to influence 
future student performance in a non-linear fashion by including second and third order 
polynomials in equations (1) and (2).  Second, we include a cohort of students who were enrolled 
in third to sixth grade in 1993, prior to the introduction of the Chicago school accountability 
reforms.  This allows us to control for the nonlinear function of school achievement that we use 
as instruments in our baseline specification.  For this specification, we obtain instruments by 
interacting the spline of school reading achievement with a dummy that takes a value of one if 
the probation policy was in effect.  If the relationship between school and student achievement is 
stable over time, this procedure will guarantee that our findings are not driven by non-linearity in 
the effect of school reading performance on student performance.  In the next section, we show 
that this does not change our results. 
                                                      
12 Because the probation policy was not commonly known until the beginning of the 1996-1997 school year, it seems 
unlikely that students would have shifted schools before this point.   15 
IV.  Results 
A. Main  Findings 
Under the assumptions described above, if teacher training has a substantial impact on 
academic achievement, we would expect to see a rapid change in the average achievement level 
around the probation cutoff.  Figure 2 provides a way to visually identify the treatment effect.  
The heavy solid line shows the average number of years the student attended a school on 
probation between 1996-97 and 1998-99.  The other lines show the average 1999 reading (solid 
line) and math (broken line) achievement respectively.  If the teacher training associated with 
probation were beneficial, we would expect to see a drop in performance as school reading 
performance neared and surpassed the cutoff.   
As expected, we see that 1999 student achievement increases as a function of 1996 school 
mean achievement.  However, the lines are relatively jagged, reflecting the fact that there are a 
limited number of schools at each level of school performance.  The dark vertical lines at 13 and 
16 percent bound the marginal area, where there is a sharp decline in the treatment.  Average 
1999 achievement increases steadily over this range, but does not appear to change 
discontinuously in reading or math, particularly in comparison to other jagged areas of the graph 
(e.g., 18-20 percent, 11-13 percent).  This suggests that the teacher training in Chicago did not 
have a substantial impact on student achievement.           
Using the instrumental variables strategy described above, we can quantify our estimates 
of the treatment effect.  In the baseline specifications, we limit our sample to students in low-
performing schools where between 5 and 25 percent of students met national norms in 1996.  We 
do so because the assumption of linearity between school reading achievement and student 
performance is most plausible in this narrower ranges of the data.  Additionally, by focusing on a 16 
narrow range around the cutoff, schools and students that receive treatment are likely to be 
comparable to their untreated counterparts.  We later show that the results are robust to changes 
in the sample and model specification. 
Table 3 presents the results of the first stage estimation.  The dependent variable is the 
number of years a student attended a school on probation between the 1996-1997 and 1998-1999 
school years (ranging from zero to three).  Note that all of the coefficients have the expected 
signs and the instruments are highly predictive.   
Table 4 presents the OLS and IV estimates.  The OLS estimate in column 1 of –0.098 
indicates that one additional year in a school on probation is associated with a decrease of 
roughly one month of learning (0.10 GEs) in reading and math.   However, we know from Table 
2 that probation schools served a significantly more disadvantaged student population than other 
schools.  When we control for a variety of observable student and school characteristics, our 
estimates drop to one-fifth of this size, although they remain negative and significant.    
Columns three to six present the IV estimates.  All of these estimates suggest that 
probation has no economically or statistically important effect on reading and math achievement.  
The coefficient with the largest absolute magnitude, -0.026, corresponds to roughly a 0.01 
standard deviation effect.  Note that the standard errors on the IV estimates in column six are 
roughly 0.025, meaning that we could detect a positive significant result as small as 0.05 GEs.  
Considering that the average elementary student during this period gained roughly 0.90 GEs per 
year and the standard deviation of 1999 achievement scores in our sample was roughly 1.9 GEs, 17 
it does not appear that the teacher training and/or technical assistance provided to probation 
schools had any meaningful effect.
13   
In addition, note that the results from columns four to six show that our IV results are not 
sensitive to the inclusion of control variables.  This suggests that after controlling for school 
reading performance, students in schools just above and below the cutoff have comparable 
observable characteristics.  This lends more credence to the assumption that the unobserved 
characteristics of students in schools just above and below the cutoff are comparable as well.  
Finally, we see that there is no significant difference between the OLS and IV results presented in 
columns four and six.  This suggests that, conditional on the set of student and school controls 
included in the models, probation waivers were not distributed on the basis of unobservable 
characteristics. 
B.  Other Effects of Probation 
  As was mentioned previously, probation might influence student mobility and test-taking 
patterns.  In particular, motivated families may want to remove their children from probation 
schools and probation schools may want to avoid testing the lowest ability children.  Using the 
IV methodology described above, we examine the causal impact of being in a probation school in 
1996-97 on the probability that a student changes schools, leaves the CPS, or fails to have an 
included test score.  These results are found in Table 5. 
                                                      
13 This strategy identifies the net effect of attending a school on probation compared to a school that just missed 
being placed on probation.  In addition to the teacher training and technical assistance, probation schools may have 
experienced somewhat different incentives than those schools that just missed the cutoff for probation.  Because 
schools that just missed being placed on probation in 1996 were at risk of being placed on probation in subsequent 
years, they too had an incentive to increase student performance.  However, to the extent that schools that were 
placed on probation in 1996 were one step closer to actual sanctions, they may have had even greater incentives to 
increase achievement.  Note that these three mechanisms—teacher training, technical assistance and differential 
incentives—all operate in the same direction, suggesting that students in schools placed on probation in 1996 should 
outperform students in schools who narrowly avoided probation that year. 18 
  The first row suggests that being in a probation school in 1997 has no significant effect 
on the probability of being enrolled in the CPS in 1999.  Because there are few high achieving 
students in probation schools it is difficult to ascertain whether probation has a differential effect 
on the enrollment decisions of high ability students. 
  In the second row, we see that probation appears to increase the probability that a student 
changes schools by 1999.  Furthermore, the point estimates are not trivial relative to the baseline 
mobility of 24 percent, particularly among the top ability quartile.  Despite this, the coefficients 
are not significantly different from zero.  The standard errors are particularly large for the high 
ability students.  Taken at face value, however, the point estimates suggest that probation may 
have induced high ability students to change schools. 
  Finally, it does not appear that being in a probation school is associated with changes in 
the probability that a previously tested student has test scores is included for evaluation.  This 
holds even for students who are in the bottom of national reading distribution.  This suggests that 
being put on probation does not cause administrators to discourage low ability students from 
being tested or from having the test scores counted for school evaluation.  Overall, probation may 
affect student decision regarding school attendance within the CPS.  However, there is no 
evidence that being in a probation school in 1997 causes students to leave the district, avoid 
testing, or have their scores excluded for evaluation purposes.   
  Because students who change schools but remain in the district are retained in our 
sample, there is no reason to believe our point estimates are biased by differential attrition of 
high and low ability students.  This is true because although the treatment is at the school level, 
we are examining student level outcomes and are not attributing average school level changes in 
performance due to student migration to the probation policy.  To see this, consider the situation 19 
in which high ability students leave probation schools and move to non-probation schools within 
the CPS.  If high ability students leave probation schools, then the difference in outcomes 
between students who initially attended schools below and above the cutoff will be lower than 
otherwise.  However, the difference in treatment will be lower as well.  Since the IV estimates 
essentially scale the difference in outcomes by the difference in treatment, the IV treatment effect 
estimate will not be biased.  However, because our instruments will induce more variation in the 
treatment of low ability students than high ability students, the estimated treatment effect will 
reflect disproportionately the experience of low ability students.  In this way migration simply 
changes the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) interpretation of our results.  Insofar as the 
probation policy and teacher training resources were primarily aimed at improving performance 
of low-ability students, the IV estimates provide quite important and useful information.     
 
  C. Heterogeneous Effects and Robustness Checks 
  Table 6 examines the heterogeneity of effects by student age, ability, and other 
demographic characteristics.  Each row corresponds to a separate regression that includes only 
students in the subgroup listed.  The cells contain IV estimates of the effect of the number of 
years in a probation school on 1999 achievement.  The top panel shows that probation has no 
effect on student performance in any grade from third to sixth in either reading or math.  The 
second panel shows separate effects for students at different points in the ability distribution in 
Spring 1996.  Because probation is determined by the percent of students who score above the 
50
th percentile, the policy creates an incentive for schools to focus attention on students near this 
point, since they are more likely to meet this standard with sufficient support.  However, we see 
that probation does not appear to have any larger effect on students in the second and third 20 
quartiles than on students at the extremes of the ability distribution.  The third panel shows no 
difference in impact across race, gender, or SES. 
  Table 7 displays results from a number of alternative specifications.  The first row 
presents the original estimates from Table 3 as a basis for comparison.  In the second row, we 
include students from all schools—regardless of the average school reading performance in 
1996—which should increase the efficiency of our estimates.  Once again we find probation to 
have no significant effect on reading and math achievement.  When we include third order 
polynomials of school performance in the third row, we find that our results do not significantly 
differ from the case in which we assume linearity.  In rows four to six, we include a cohort of 
students from 1993, prior to the introduction of the school reforms.  While no students or schools 
in this cohort received the treatment, we can use these data to make certain our findings are not 
driven by non-linearity in the relationship between school reading performance and student 
achievement.  The instruments in these models are the interaction between the splines of school 
reading performance and cohort.  We see that the estimates do not change for either reading or 
mathematics.       
  Many of the schools that scored just above the probation cutoff, or were waived from 
probation, were placed on remediation.  These schools did not receive the same close monitoring 
or financial support as probation schools, but they were subject to somewhat heightened 
oversight.  To check whether this heightened oversight may have impacted achievement, row 
seven examines whether being in a school on probation or remediation has any effect on 
academic achievement.
14  We find no effect.   
                                                      
14 For this specification, our instrument is a single dummy variable indicating whether 15 percent or more students in 
a school performed at or above national norms in reading in 1996, rather than the spline in 1996 reading achievement 
that is used in the baseline specification.  We do so because the discontinuity between 1996 school mean reading 21 
  Even after schools were taken off probation, they were required to maintain a relationship 
with their external partner for an additional year.  Also, some low performing schools that were 
not placed on probation chose to hire an external partner even though it was not officially 
required.  To test whether the presence of an external partner, rather than simply being on 
probation, influenced achievement levels in low-achieving elementary schools, row eight of 
Table 7 shows the estimated effect of being in a school with an external partner.  This effect is 
not statistically different from zero.
15 
  One might argue that the monitoring and staff development that probation schools receive 
should not have an observable impact on student achievement for several years.  The final two 
rows in Table 7 explore this possibility.  In row 9, we examine the effect of probation on students 
who remained in the same school between 1996 and 1999.  Thus, in this sample, the students in 
probation schools received three full years of treatment.  If one believes that probation has a 
greater impact for students who spend an extended period in the school, then these estimates 
should be larger than the original estimates.  However, it appears that even these students 
received no significant benefit from being in a school on probation.  It is possible that reforms 
instituted by the external partners and probation managers took a year or two to become 
effective, in which case one would not expect any impacts until the 1998-99 school year.  By 
examining the three-year period, we will observe a small, diluted effect.  To explore this 
possibility, row 10 shows the effect of probation on 1998-99 gains, but still finds no effect.  
Finally, row 11 shows the effect of probation on 1998-99 gains for the sub-sample of students 
                                                                                                                                                                           
achievement and the average years in a school on probation or remediation is extremely sharp at the official 
probation cutoff of 15 percent, in contrast to the baseline specification that uses years on probation alone. 
15 Once again, our instrument is a single dummy variable that indicates whether at least 15 percent of students in a 
school performed at or above national norms in reading in 1996. 22 
who remained in the same school between 1996 and 1999.  The point estimates are not 
statistically different than zero.  
  A wide variety of non-profit organizations and universities worked with probation 
schools in order to improve student achievement.  These external partners varied considerably in 
their institutional affiliation (e.g., universities versus private organizations), programmatic focus 
(e.g., school organization versus staff training versus curriculum development) and educational 
philosophy (e.g., whole-language versus direct instruction).  It is possible that some external 
partners were more effective than others, which might explain the weak aggregate effects that we 
find.  Note, however, that the zero net effect implies that if some external partners increased 
student performance then others must have decreased student achievement levels.  Table 8 
examines the probation effects for several of the largest external partners.  Because schools were 
largely free to select their external partner, these estimates cannot be interpreted as causal effects, 
although they may still provide some insight.  Nonetheless, it does not appear that any of the 
major external partners had a significant impact on student achievement in the probation schools. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  In an effort to improve student achievement in Chicago in the mid-nineties, the CPS 
placed nearly 20 percent of the lowest achieving elementary schools in the city on probation.  
The financial and technical support provided to probation schools was dedicated specifically to 
improving classroom instruction, primarily through teacher training and staff development.  
Indeed, teachers in probation schools reported moderate increases in the frequency with which 
they attended professional development activities as well as more substantial increases in the 
quality of the professional development they received.   23 
  The preceding analysis, however, indicates that the training provided to teachers in 
probation schools had no discernable effect on student achievement.  These results are robust to a 
variety of alternative specifications and do not differ across student ability, gender, race, or 
family income.  While consistent with much of the earlier research on teacher training in the 
United States, these findings are in stark contrast to the recent work of Angrist and Lavy (2001), 
who found that teacher training in Jerusalem schools yielded large dividends in terms of student 
performance.   
  While it may not be surprising that different programs in different settings have different 
effects, it is useful to examine some of the possible explanations for the discrepancies in order to 
better understand how the results from each study might be generalized.  Several differences 
stand out between the Chicago and Jerusalem programs.  First, the Chicago program was 
implemented in a group of extremely high-poverty, low-achieving schools.  In contrast, the 
program in Jerusalem took place in mostly middle to lower-middle class neighborhoods, which 
included a combination of some upper middle class schools attended by children of Hebrew 
University faculty as well as some poorer schools attended by immigrants (Angrist 2001).   
Second, the training provided in the Jerusalem schools was highly structured and closely aligned 
with the school curriculum whereas the training in Chicago was relatively unstructured and less 
well aligned.  Finally, the training in Jerusalem was complemented by direct services to students 
in the form of after school learning centers and other programs for immigrant families. 
  In this light, one might interpret the findings of these two studies as showing that teacher 
training can have a significant, positive impact on student achievement under generally favorable 
conditions, but that such benefits depend on the context and quality of the program.  
Unfortunately, national data suggest that the frequency and nature of professional development 24 
activities in Chicago is comparable to other school districts in this country (Parsad et. al. 2001).  
Thus, our findings suggest that moderate increases in the intensity of the professional 
development efforts along the lines of the Chicago program will likely fail to improve the 
achievement of students in failing schools. 
   25 
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Monthly Participation in Professional Development Activities by 1997 Probation Status 















































































































Observations  215  936  365 2,068 145 1,375 
Notes for Table 1: Probation status refers to the probation status of the school in 1997.  Standard deviations are in 




(standard deviations)  Total 
Never in school on 
probation between 
1997 and 1999 
In school on 
probation for at 
least one year 
between 1997 and 
1999 
Treatment     
In school on probation in 1997  0.140  0.000  0.772 
Years in school on probation from 1997 to 1999  0.334  0.000  1.889 
Student Outcomes     














Not tested in 1999  0.163  0.171  0.126 
Tested, but excluded from reporting in 1999  0.163  0.163  0.164 
Enrolled in the CPS  0.860  0.851  0.904 
Changed schools (left 1996 school)  0.240  0.211  0.371 
Student Demographics     














Tested, but excluded from reporting in 1996  0.069  0.068  0.071 
Black    0.534  0.476  0.802 
Hispanic 0.322  0.351  0.190 
Male   0.506  0.505  0.511 
Black Male   0.267  0.237  0.408 
Hispanic Male  0.165  0.179  0.098 







Free Lunch  0.798  0.764  0.957 
Reduced Price Lunch  0.082  0.094  0.027 
Currently in Bilingual Program  0.196  0.211  0.124 
Formerly in Bilingual Program  0.154  0.175  0.057 
Special Education  0.116  0.115  0.117 
Living with Relatives  0.132  0.143  0.080 
Living in Foster Care  0.044  0.039  0.071 














Third grade  0.268  0.264  0.288 
Fourth grade  0.250  0.249  0.254 
Fifth grade  0.241  0.242  0.237 
Sixth grade  0.241  0.245  0.222 








Attendance Rate  92.6  93.1  90.7 
Mobility Rate  29.3  28.0  35.6 33 
Truancy Rate  2.5  1.9  5.1 
Percent Black  53.3  47.8  79.1 
Percent Hispanic  32.1  34.7  19.7 
Percent Limited English Proficient  17.4  18.8  10.9 
Percent Low Income  85.4  83.3  95.1 
Number of Observations  127,135  104,687  22,448 
Notes to Table 2: The sample includes students who were in the third through sixth grades in Fall 1996.  We exclude 
children who were missing demographic information.  We also drop observations with missing school demographic 
variables as well as all students in special needs schools.    34 
Table 3 
The Effect of the 1996 School Reading Performance on the Average Years a Student 
Spends in a School on Probation between 1997 and 1999 
 Dependent  Variables 
Independent Variables 
Number of years a student spends in a school on 
probation from 1997 to 1999 












Number of Schools  246 
Number of Observations  47,274 
R-Squared 0.642 
F-Statistic of Instruments  F=105.7 
[p=0.000] 
Notes to Table 3:  Sample includes students who were in schools in the Fall of 1996 that had between 5% and 25% 
of students at or above national norms in reading.  The F-statistic of the instruments takes into account that the 
instruments are jointly collinear with the second stage control variable “% at or above national norms in reading.”  
All test statistics are computed taking into account that observations within a school may not be independent.  The 
regression includes the following variables that are not shown here: 1996 math and reading scores, student 
demographics including whether the student was included for test reporting purposes in 1996, age as of Fall 1996, 
race and gender indicators (Black, Hispanic, male, Black*male, Hispanic*male), free and reduced price lunch status, 
current and former bilingual status, special education, an indicator of whether the student was living with relatives or 
living in foster care, concentration of poverty and social status in  the student’s census block group, and school 
demographics including the attendance rate, percent Black, percent Hispanic, percent LEP, percent low income, 
mobility rate, truancy rate, and percent at or above national norms in math. 35 
  
Table 4 
IV and OLS Estimates of the Effect of Teacher Training on Student Achievement 
Dependent 
Variables  OLS OLS OLS  IV  IV  IV 





























Covariates  No No Yes No No Yes 
School Level 
Covariates  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Notes to Table 4:  Sample includes students who were in schools in the Fall of 1996 that had between 5% and 25% 
of students at or above national norms in reading.   36 
Table 5 
IV Estimates of the Effect of Being in a Probation School in 1997 








































































Not tested or 












Notes to Table 5:  Baseline sample includes students who were in schools in the Fall of 1996 that had between 5% 
and 25% of students at or above national norms in reading.  Also included (but not shown) in the regression 
specification are the controls described in Table 2.  All estimates are computed using two stage least squares.  The 





The Effect of Probation on Student Achievement 
  Probation Treatment Effect 
Subgroup  1999 Reading Score  1999 Math Score 
Grade Level    
















Prior Achievement    
1



















Race, Gender & SES    




























Notes to Table 6:  Sample includes students who were in schools in the Fall of 1996 that had between 5% and 25% 
of students at or above national norms in reading.  Also included (but not shown) in the regression specification are 




Row Sample  Dependent 
Variable  Treatment  Readin
g  Math 
  Original Estimates        
1 
Baseline sample (students in 
1996 schools where 5-25% 
of students met national 










  Alternative Samples & 
Specifications        
2  All schools 
1999 
Achievement 







Baseline sample (controlling 
for third order polynomials 
of school performance) 
1999 
Achievement 







All schools + cohort of 
students in school in 1993 in 
schools where 5-25% of 
students met national norms 
in reading  
1999 
Achievement 







Baseline sample + 1993 
cohort (all schools)  
1999 
Achievement 







Baseline sample + 1993 
cohort (controlling for 










7  Baseline sample 
1999 
Achievement 







8  Baseline sample 
1999 
Achievement 







Students in same school 
from 1996 to 1999 
1999 
Achievement 

















Students in same school 










Notes to Table 7:  Baseline sample includes students who were in schools in the Fall of 1996 that had between 5% 
and 25% of students at or above national norms in reading.  Also included (but not shown) in the regression 
specification are the controls described in Table 2.  All estimates are computed using two stage least squares.  The 
instruments are as previously indicated except in the specifications in which the treatment is defined as years in 
school on probation or remediation and years in school with external partner.  For these specifications, the 
instrument is a dummy variable indicating the school surpassed 15% at or above national norms in reading. 39 
Table 8 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Specific External Partners on Student Achievement 
  Treatment Effect of Year with External Partner on 1999 
Achievement 
External Partner  Reading Math 






































Observations 47,274  47,118 
Notes to Table 8:  The sample includes students who were in schools in the Fall of 1996 that had between 5% and 
25% of students at or above national norms in reading.  We use all controls from the baseline (Table 2) specification 
as well as the total number of years a student was enrolled in a school on probation from 1997 to 1999. 